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ING USA ANNUITY AND LIFE )( 
INSURANCE COMPANY and ING )( 
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC, )( DEPUTYCLERKSUPERIORCQURT 
)( FULTON COUNTY, GA 
)( 
Plaintiffs, )( Civil Action No. 2007-CV-134590 
)( 
)( 
v. )( 
)( 
)( 
J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES INC. and )( 
DAMIAN BERRY, )( 
)( 
Defendants. )( 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On June 24,2010, Counsel appeared before the Court to present 
argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. After hearing the 
arguments made by counsel, and reviewing the briefs submitted on the motion 
and the record in the case, the Court finds as follows: 
Defendant J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. ("JPMSI") provided investment 
banking services to an Australian mining company named Sons of Gwalia 
Limited ("Gwalia"). Defendant Damian Berry ("Berry") was an employee of 
JPMSI between 1998 and 2002 and was JPMSI's relationship manager for 
Gwalia during that time. Starting in 2000, Gwalia decided to raise capital through 
the private placement of debt securities. This private placement strategy 
occurred over the course of two offerings-the first in the fall of 2000 ("2000 
Private Placement") and the second in early 2002 ("2002 Private Placement"). 
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Plaintiffs lNG-USA Annuity and Life Insurance ("lNG-USA") and ING Investment 
Management LLC ("lNG-1M") participated in the 2002 Private Placement. ING-
USA, a life insurance company, ultimately purchased $32 million of the notes 
offered by Gwalia in the 2002 Private Placement. JPMSI acted as Gwalia's 
broker for both the 2000 Private Placement and the 2002 Private Placement and, 
among other things, assisted Gwalia in preparing a private placement 
memorandum for each offering. In 2004, Gwalia entered into voluntary 
administration which is the Australian equivalent of bankruptcy. 
Plaintiffs allege that during the 2002 Private Placement, Defendants 
misrepresented and concealed Gwalia's true financial picture. In particular, 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants misrepresented and concealed: (1) Gwalia's 
investments in derivatives called Indexed Gold Put Options ("IGPOs"), (2) 
Gwalia's liquidity crisis following an unauthorized trading spree by Gwalia's 
director of finance, and (3) problems with Gwalia's acquisition of another gold 
mining company, Pacific Mining Corporation Limited ("Pac Min"). Based on 
these allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of the Georgia Securities 
Act of 1973 ("GSA"), common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and 
violations of the Georgia RICO Act. Defendants have moved for summary 
judgment on all claims against them. 
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.GA 
§ 9-11-56 when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact 
remains to be tried and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most 
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favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991). 
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants first argue 
that Plaintiff lNG-1M has not suffered any damages whatsoever. In response, 
Plaintiffs simply argue that Defendants have recycled an arg ument left over from 
their motion to dismiss in which they questioned whether lNG-1M was a proper 
party to this lawsuit. In its Order on Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court 
held that at that early stage of litigation, lNG-1M should not be "foreclosed from 
being able to prove recoverable damages" but also warned that "issues of 
specific damages suffered by lNG-1M ... may be raised again in any motions for 
summary judgment filed by Defendants." Defendants again question lNG-1M's 
involvement in this lawsuit and argue that Plaintiffs have failed to produce any 
evidence to show that lNG-1M has suffered any damage as a result of 
Defendants' alleged misconduct. Damage to the plaintiff is an essential element 
of each of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants. Yet, in their response to 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs have failed to produce any 
evidence that lNG-1M has suffered damage in this case. Accordingly, summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants is GRANTED all on claims asserted by lNG-1M. 
Second, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs' GSA and common law fraud claims because Plaintiffs lack evidence to 
show scienter. Scienter is an essential element of both a claim under the GSA 
and for common law fraud. See Bogle v. Bragg, 248 Ga. App. 632, 634 (2001) 
and GCA Strategic Investment Fund. Ltd. v. Joseph Charles & Associates. Inc., 
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245 Ga. App. 460, 464 (2000). Except in rare cases where the evidence is "plain 
and indisputable," determination of scienter is an issue of fact for the jury. Kilroy 
v. Alpharetta Fitness, Inc., 295 Ga. App. 274, 280 (2008). The Court finds that 
there is evidence upon which a jury could find that Defendants acted with 
scienter in making misrepresentations or omissions regarding (1) the risks 
involved in Gwalia's investments in IGPOs including Berry's knowledge of those 
risks and his authorization of the description used for the IGPOs, (2) Gwalia's 
liquidity crisis following an unauthorized trading spree by its director of finance 
including the help provided by Berry in shoring up that crisis and (3) Gwalia's 
acquisition of PacMin, including Berry's knowledge of problems with PacMin's 
operations. 
Third, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs' GSA, common law fraud, and negligent misrepresentation claims 
because Plaintiffs cannot show that they reasonably relied on Defendants. To 
this end, Defendants argue that cautionary language in the 2002 Private 
Placement memorandum shields them from liability. Specifically, Defendants 
argue that the private placement memorandum states, among other things, that 
JPMSI "neither offer[s] an opinion as to nor assume[s] any responsibility for the 
adequacy, accuracy, or completeness of any information contained herein." The 
Court finds that this type of standard disclaimer does not shield Defendants from 
liability and does not preclude Plaintiffs from showing reasonable reliance. In re 
National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., Investment Litigation, 541 
F.Supp.2d 986,1005 (S.D. Ohio 2007) ("Courts have long held that general 
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disclaimers of accuracy do not shield sellers who knowingly make false 
statements"); In re Prudential Securities Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litigation, 930 F. 
Supp. 68, 72 (1996) ("cautionary language does not protect material 
misrepresentations or omissions when defendants knew they were false when 
made"); Clayton v. Heartland Resources. Inc., 2009 WL 790175, *5 (W.O. Ky. 
2009) (denying a motion to dismiss a claim against an attorney who prepared 
offering documents in a securities transaction ruling that the attorney was a 
primary participant in the alleged wrongdoing and could not be shielded from 
liability by language in those documents disclaiming their accuracy and 
completeness when he knowingly made misrepresentations and omissions in 
those documents). The court in In re National Century found that plaintiffs' 
claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation could proceed because 
cautionary language will not protect misrepresentations and omissions knowingly 
made and the document itself expressly invited plaintiffs' reliance. Similarly, 
here, there is evidence upon which a jury could find knowing omissions and 
misrepresentations by JPMSI and the cautionary language follows a paragraph 
which twice states that the private placement memorandum is to be used to 
evaluate Plaintiffs' potential investment. The Court also finds that 
misrepresentations and omissions were made in documents other than the 
private placement memorandum and, therefore, any cautionary language in the 
private placement memorandum cannot be used to shield Defendants from 
liability for alleged misrepresentations and omissions in other documents. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the cautionary language in the private 
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placement memorandum does not preclude a showing of reasonable reliance by 
Plaintiffs on their GSA, common law fraud, and negligent misrepresentation 
claims. 
Fourth Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' own due diligence proves that 
they did not reasonably rely on Defendants. The Court finds that as accredited 
investors, the private placement memorandum called on Plaintiffs to perform their 
own due diligence, which they did. Georgia courts routinely reject fraud claims 
when plaintiffs fail to do adequate due diligence to uncover the fraud. See, e.g., 
First Union National Bank of Georgia v. Gurley, 208 Ga. App. 647, 649 (1993). 
However, the opposite does not hold true. In other words, simply because a 
plaintiff conducts extensive due diligence, yet fails to detect the alleged fraud, 
does not mean that the plaintiff has not relied on misrepresentations or omissions 
by the defendant. The Court finds that the due diligence that Plaintiffs conducted 
does not negate their reliance. 
Fifth, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' GSA claim against Berry is time 
barred. Plaintiffs deny that they are pursuing a GSA claim against Berry and, 
thus, the Court finds this point moot. 
Sixth, Defendants argue that ING-USA's GSA claim against JPMSI is time 
barred because lNG-USA was not a party to a tolling agreement entered into on 
July 18, 2006. lNG-USA responds that it was, in fact, a party to that tolling 
agreement. Contract construction is a matter of law for the court. Livoti v. 
Aycock, 263 Ga. App. 897, 901(2003). The first step in contract construction is to 
"look to the four corners of the instrument to determine the intention of the parties 
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from the language employed." !.Q.,; see also O.C.GA § 13-2~3. The tolling 
agreement provides that: 
THIS TOLLING AGREEMENT is made and entered into by and 
between J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc., including its parents, 
affiliates, owners, successors and assigns (collectively, "J.P. 
Morgan"), and ING Investment Management LLC, for itself and as 
agent for ING USA Annuity and Life Insurance Company, Security 
Life of Denver Insurance Company and ReliaStar Life Insurance 
Company, and each of their successor and assigns (collectively, 
"ING"). 
The Court finds that the express terms of the tolling agreement make clear that it 
covers lNG-USA. The Court rejects Defendants' arguments that ING-USA's 
claim against JPMSI under the GSA is time barred. 
Seventh, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' RICO claim fails because 
Plaintiffs cannot prove racketeering activity. Specifically, Defendants argue that 
because Plaintiffs cannot prove their GSA claim due to a lack of scienter and 
justifiable reliance, their RICO claim, which is based on Defendants' two alleged 
violations of the GSA, must also fail. For the reasons stated above, the Court 
finds that there is evidence upon which a jury could find that Defendants acted 
with scienter and that Plaintiffs justifiably relied on Defendants. As ING-USA's 
GSA claims have survived summary judgment, so has its Georgia RICO claim. 
Eighth, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to show that 
Defendants' actions constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. In pertinent 
part, a pattern of racketeering activity is defined by the Georgia RICO Act as 
"[e]ngaging in at least two acts of racketeering activity." O.C.GA 16-14-3(8). 
While Defendants argue that the two Private Placements were merely a single 
transaction completed over the course of two closings, the Court disagrees. 
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JPMSI, or is predecessor, was hired on two separate occasions, as evidenced by 
two different engagement letters, to conduct the two separate private 
placements. The two private placements each had separate private placement 
memoranda and different investors. Despite Defendants arguments, the Court 
finds that the 2001 Private Placement and the 2002 Private Placement were not 
a single transaction. The Court finds that there is evidence upon which a jury 
could find that Defendants violated the Georgia RICO Act based on two predicate 
acts-misrepresentations and omissions in the private placement memoranda for 
the 2000 Private Placement and the 2002 Private Placement. 
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot prove causation for any of 
their claims. In support of this argument, Defendants maintain that the only 
evidence Plaintiffs have of causation is a few paragraphs in their expert's report 
which is inadmissible under Georgia's standard for expert testimony. Proximate 
cause is generally a jury question. "Where the proof 'does not plainly, palpably 
and indisputably show a lack of proximate cause,' the issue is for the jury." 
Malak v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta. 195 Ga. App. 105 (1990) (citing DeKalb 
County Hosp. Auth. v. Theofanidis, 157 Ga. App. 811, 812(2) (1981)). The Court 
finds that Plaintiffs, through their expert and by pointing to deposition testimony 
by other witnesses, have provided evidence sufficient for a jury to conclude that 
Defendants alleged misrepresentations and omissions were a proximate cause 
of their injury. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and 
DENIED IN PART. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants is GRANTED on 
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all claims asserted by lNG-1M. Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants is 
DENIED on all claims asserted by lNG-USA. 
SO ORDERED this 11th day of August, 2010. 
Ai I LA De 8m lAM t?"A, 
Alice D. Bonner, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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